In Spatial Voting Theory, distortion is a measure of how good the winner is. It is proved that no deterministic voting mechanism can guarantee a distortion better than 3, even for simple metrics such as a line. In this study, we wish to answer the following question: how does the distortion value change if we allow less motivated agents to abstain from the election?
Introduction
The goal in Social Choice Theory is to design mechanisms that aggregate agents' preferences into a collective decision. Voting is a well-studied method for aggregating preferences which has numerous applications in multi-agent systems. Roughly, a voting mechanism takes the preferences of the agents over a set of alternatives as input and selects one of the alternatives as the winner.
One approach to estimate the quality of a voting mechanism is to use the utilitarian view which assumes that each agent has cost over the alternatives. For example, spatial models, locate the voters and the alternatives in a finite metric space M, and the cost of alternative X for voter v i is equal to their distance. Considering these costs, the optimal candidate is defined to be the candidate that minimizes the social cost. Ideally, we would like the optimal candidate to be the winner; however, since voting mechanisms only take the ordinal preferences of voters, it is reasonable to expect that the winner is not always optimal. The question then arises: how good is the winner, i.e., what is the worst-case ratio of the social cost of the winner to the social cost of the optimal candidate? This ratio is called the distortion value of a voting mechanism. It is known that no deterministic voting mechanism can guarantee a distortion better than 3, even for simple metrics such as a line. To see this, consider the example shown in Figure 1 . In this example, candidate L is the optimal candidate, and under the plurality voting rule candidate R is the winner. Thus, the distortion value is 0.51(0.5 − ε) + 0.49 · 1 0.51(0.5 + ε) 3.
The example of Figure 1 shows the lower-bound of 3 on the distortion value. However, it seems unrealistic in some ways. Although the voters located near the point 0.5 are closer to R, they have a very low incentive to vote for R, since their costs for both candidates are almost equal. On the other hand, agents located at 0 have a strong motivation to vote for L. In fact, if voters are allowed to abstain (which is a natural assumption in many real-world elections, especially in large elections), we expect L to be the winner rather than R.
In this study, our goal is to tackle this problem: how does the distortion value change if we allow less motivated agents to abstain from voting?
Abstention
Scientists have long studied the factors affecting participation in an election. In particular, Wolfinger and Rosenstone [11] argue that better educated and more informed voters participate with a higher probability, or Lijphart [16] discusses that the voters on the left side of the political spectrum participate less frequently than the ones on the right. Similarly, the decision to vote may rely on variables such as income level or the sense of civic duty [24] .
Traditionally, both game theoretic and decision theoretic models of turnout have been proposed. In the heart of most of these models lies the assumption that there are costs for voting 1 . These costs include the costs of collecting and processing information, waiting in the queue and voting itself. Presumably, if a voter decides to abstain, she does not have to pay these costs. Thus, a rational voter must receive utility from voting. There is evidence suggesting that voters behave strategically when deciding to vote and take the costs and benefits into account. For example, Blais [3] finds that the closeness of elections influences the turnout; or Riker and Ordeshook [22] show that the turnout is inversely related to voting costs.
Apart from social-psychological traits, spatial models of voting suggest that voters' abstention may stem from their ideological distances from the candidates. The work of Downs [8] initiated this line of research. He argues that in a two-candidate election under the majority rule, the choice between voting and abstaining is related to the voter's comparative evaluation of the candidates. Riker and Ordeshook [22] improve this model by reformulating the original equation to incorporate other social and psychological factors.
Many empirical studies in the spatial theory of abstention frequently suggest that citizens are more likely to abstain when they feel indifferent toward the candidates or alienated from them. However, the models introduced by Downs [8] and Riker and Ordeshook [22] are only capable of representing the indifference-based abstention which occurs when the difference between the costs of candidates for a voter is too small to justify voting costs. On the other hand, these models cannot justify alienation-based abstention, which occurs when a voter is too distant from the alternatives to justify voting costs. To alleviate this, some studies argue that the relative distance plays a more critical role than the absolute distance [15, 12] .
Our Work
In this paper, we wish to study the effect of abstention on the distortion value. To represent abstention, we consider a simple spatial model, which is a more general form of the model suggested by Kirchgässner [15] . In this model, there are two candidates, and the voters decide whether to vote or abstain based on a comparison between the cost (i.e., distance) of their preferred alternative and the cost of the other alternative. We define the concepts of expected winner and expected distortion to evaluate the distortion of an election in our model. Our results fully characterize the distortion value and provide a complete picture of the model. For the special case that our model conforms exactly to that of [15] , we show that the distortion of the expected winner is upper bounded by 1.522. We also give an almost tight upper bound on the expected distortion value of big elections.
Finally, we generalize our results to include arbitrary metric spaces. We show that the same upper bounds we obtained on the distortion value for the line metric also work for arbitrary metric space.
Related Work
The utilitarian view, which assumes all of the voters have costs for each alternative, is a wellstudied approach in welfare economics [23, 19] . This viewpoint has received attention from the AI community during the past decade [20, 4] . Procaccia and Rosenschein [20] first introduced distortion as a benchmark for measuring the efficiency of a social choice rule in utilitarian settings. The worst-case distortion of many social choice functions is shown to be high. However, imposing some mild constraints on the cost functions yields strong positive results. One of these assumptions, which is reasonable in many political and social settings, is the spatial assumption, which assumes that the agent costs form a metric space. [9, 17] .
Anshelevich, Bhardwaj and Postl [1] were first to analyze the distortion of ordinal social choice functions when evaluated for metric preferences. For plurality, Borda, and k-approval rules, they prove that the worst case distortion is unbounded. On the positive side, they show that for the Copeland rule, the distortion value is at most 5. They also prove the lower bound of 3 for any deterministic mechanism. They conjecture that the worst-case distortion of Ranked Pairs social choice rule meets this lower-bound, which is later refuted by Goel, Krishnaswamy, Anilesh, and Munagala [14] .
Anshelevich and Postl [2] consider randomized social choice rules. The output of such rules is a probability distribution over the set of alternatives rather than a single winning alternative. They show that for α-decisive metric spaces 2 any randomized rule has a lower-bound of 1 + α on the distortion value. For the case of two alternatives, they propose an optimal algorithm with the expected distortion of at most 1 + α. Cheng et al. [6] characterized the positional voting rules with constant expected distortion value (independent of the number of candidates and the metric space). Cheng et al. [5] consider the setting that the candidates are drawn independently from the population of voters and prove the tight bound of 1.1716 for the distortion value in a line metric and an upper-bound of 2 for an arbitrary metric space.
In addition to the studies mentioned in Section 1.1, many other studies consider the effects of abstention in various types of elections. In a seminal paper, Moulin [18] shows that every Condorcet consistent method is susceptible to the no-show paradox. Desmedt and Elkind in [7] propose a game theoretic analysis of the plurality voting with the possibility of abstention and characterize the preference profiles that admit a pure Nash equilibrium. Rabinovich et al. [21] consider the computational aspects of iterative plurality voting with abstention.
Preliminaries
Every election E consists of two ingredients: a set V of n voters and a set C of two candidates. We denote the i'th voter by v i , and the candidates by L and R. Furthermore, we suppose that the candidates and the voters are embedded in a finite metric space M. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we suppose that M is a line, and L and R are located at points 0 and 1, respectively. For each voter v i , we refer to her location by x i . Moreover, we denote by d i,X , the distance between voter v i and candidate X ∈ {L, R}. Definition 2.1. For every candidate X ∈ {L, R}, we define the average social cost of X as
The optimal candidate is the candidate that minimizes the average social cost.
We consider a simple scenario where the winner is elected via the majority rule (in case of a tie, the winner is determined by tossing a fair coin). Furthermore, we suppose that each voter either abstains or votes for one of the candidates. In Section 2.1 we give a formal description of the voting behavior of the agents.
Voting Behavior of individuals
As mentioned, we employ a simple probabilistic model, where each voter independently decides whether to abstain or participate by evaluating her distances from the candidates. Fix a voter v i and let X be the candidate who is closer to v i in M andX be the other candidate. We suppose that v i votes sincerely for her preferred candidate X with a probability p i , where p i is a function of d i,X and d i,X , and abstains with probability 1 − p i .
Denote by f the probability function that p i is derived from, i.e.,
Since f represents the probability of voting, we expect f to satisfy certain axiomatic assumptions. Recall that in the spatial voting models, there are two crucial sources of abstention:
i Indifference-based Abstention (IA): the smaller the difference between the distances of a voter from the candidates is, the less likely it is that she casts a vote.
ii Alienation-based Abstention (AA): the further a voter is located from the candidates, the less likely it is that she casts a vote.
To illustrate, for the voters in Figure 2 , we have:
• Voters v 1 , v 2 , v 3 prefer L and voters v 5 and v 6 prefer R.
• Voter v 1 has a strong incentive to cast a vote since her cost for L is zero.
• Voter v 4 always abstains, since her costs for both the candidates are equal (IA).
• For voters v 2 and v 3 , we have
• For voters v 5 and v 6 , we have p 5 ≥ p 6 , since v 6 is more alienated (AA).
Figure 2: A simple election instance.
As mentioned, the models of Downs [8] and Riker and Ordeshook [22] are only capable of explaining the Indifference-based abstention, since they only consider the absolute difference between the distances of the candidates to a voter. To resolve this, some recent studies argue that the relative distance, rather than absolute distance, is relevant.
In this study, we follow the model of Kirchgässner [15] which is based on the relative distances. The idea behind their model is that, the probability that a voter casts a vote depends on her ability to distinguish between the candidates. By WeberFechner's law (see [10] ), the ability to distinguish between the candidates depends on their relative distance to the voter. Formally, the probability p i that voter v i votes for X is calculated by the following formula:
In this paper, we consider a more general form of Equation (1) as follows:
where β is a constant in [0, 1]. Figure 3 shows the behavior of ζ β for different values of β. As is clear from the figure, for the smaller values of β, voters are more eager to participate. In fact, the exponent β can be seen as a quantitative measure of how much this ideological distance matters. For the special case of β = 0, voters always participate in the election, regardless of their location. It can be easily observed that for any 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, function ζ β satisfies all the desired criteria. 
The Expected Winner and the Expected Distortion
As discussed, our assumption is that the majority rule determines the winner. However, considering the stochastic behavior of the voters, the winner is not deterministic, i.e., each candidate has a probability of winning. Denote by #X, the expected number of voters who vote for X. Furthermore, denote by P X , the probability that candidate X wins the election. We define the expected winner of the election as the candidate with the maximum expected number of votes.
Definition 2.2. For a candidate X ∈ {L, R}, we define the distortion of X, denoted by D(X) as the ratio cost(X)/cost(O), where O ∈ {L, R} is the optimal candidate.
Note that the distortion value of the optimal candidate is 1. We consider two approaches to evaluate the distortion of an election E. In the first approach, we define the distortion of E as the distortion of the expected winner, i.e., D(W), where W ∈ {L, R} is the expected winner. Another approach, which is more promising, is to define the distortion of E as the expected distortion of the winner, over all possible outcomes, i.e.,
For convenience, we useḊ(E) to refer to the distortion value of E regarding the former approach andD(E) to refer to the distortion value regarding the latter. We dedicate two separate sections to analyze the distortion value of elections according to both approaches. Even though the maximum distortion depends on the value of β, we provide essential tools to analyze the election for any β ∈ [0, 1].
Distortion of the Expected Winner
In this section, we analyze the distortion value of the expected winner. Recall that the expected winner is the candidate with a higher expected number of votes. There are two reasons why we consider the distortion value of the expected winner. First, since the number of votes each candidate receives is concentrated around its expectation, in elections with a large number of voters (relative to the number of candidates), the expected winner has a very high chance of winning, especially, when there is a non-negligible difference between the expected number of votes each candidate receives. Secondly, we use the tight upper-bound on the distortion value of the expected winner to prove an upper bound on the expected distortion of the election for the other model.
Throughout this section, we assume that the probability that a voter casts a vote is
Furthermore, we suppose w.l.o.g. that L is the expected winner. Moreover, we assume that the optimal candidate is R, otherwise the distortion equals 1. We also consider four regions A, B, C and D as illustrated in Figure 4 . Theorem 3.1. There exists an election E, such thatḊ(E) is maximum, and the voters in E are located in at most three different locations.
Here, we only present a sketch of the proof of Theorem 3.1 and leave the details to the Appendix. The basic idea to prove Theorem 3.1 is as follows: we prove that for every election E, there exists an election instance E with the same expected winner, andḊ(E ) ≥Ḋ(E). Also, the voters in E are located in at most 3 different locations. To show this, we collect the voters in E by carefully moving them forward and backward via a sequence of valid displacements, as defined in Definition 3.2.
Definition 3.2. For an election E, define a displacement as the operation of moving a subset of the voters forward or backward on the line to a new location. A displacement is valid if it does not alter the expected winner, and furthermore, does not decrease the distortion value of the expected winner.
In Lemmas 3.3,3.4, and 3.5 we introduce three sorts of valid displacement which help us collect the voters. Figure 5 , illustrates a summary of these displacements. Lemma 3.4. Consider voters v i and v j located respectively at x i ∈ B and x j ∈ C. Then,
Lemma 3.5. Consider voters v i , v j , where x i , x j ∈ B ∪ D and both v i and v j belong to the same region. Then, moving both the voters to
is a valid displacement.
Using these three types of valid displacements, we can establish an election with the maximum distortion, and the following structure (see Figure 6 ): the interior of regions A and C contain no voter. All the voters are located at three points, namely x b , x d and x m , where x b ∈ B, x m = 1/2, and x d ∈ D. Note that, the maximum distortion value and the location of x b and x d in the worst-case scenario essentially relies on the value of β in ζ β . Figure 6 : For any β ∈ [0, 1], there is an election with the maximum distortion, and the above structure.
A Tight Upper Bound onḊ(·)
In this section, we discuss the value ofḊ(E), when the probability function is ζ β and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
Let us first consider one of the boundary cases: ζ 0 . For ζ 0 , the probability that a voter casts a vote is
independent of her location. Therefore, the same example demonstrated in Section 1 implies that no upper-bound better than 3 can be obtained forḊ(E), when the participation function is ζ 0 . Now, consider ζ β , and let E be the election that maximizesḊ(E). As discussed in the previous section, we can assume w.l.o.g that the voters in E are located at three points, namely, x b ∈ B, x d ∈ D, and x m = 0.5. Suppose that the ratio q b of the voters are at x b , the ratio q d of the voters are at x d , and the ratio q m of the voters are at 1/2 (q b + q d + q m = 1). We have
Since L is the expected winner, we have
On the other hand, we have
Therefore, in order to find the maximum distortion, we need to solve the following convex optimization problem:
Now consider another boundary case: ζ 1 . For ζ 1 the answer to the above convex program is
1.522, which can be obtained by choosing
, q m = 0, x b = 0, and
. A graphical representation of this construction is shown in Figure 7 .
Figure 7: A tight example for β = 1.
In general for 0 < β < 1, the maximum distortion value equals the answer of Convex Program (4).
In Figure 8 , we show the answer of this program for different values of β. As illustrated in Figure 8 , It can be seen that the minimum possible distortion value is √ 2. (for β 0.705.)
Expected Distortion
Recall that in our second approach, we define the distortion of an election as the expected distortion of the winner, where the expectation is taken over random behaviors of the voters. Throughout this section, we assume that the probability that a voter casts a vote is
Furthermore, we suppose w.l.o.g that candidate R is the optimal candidate. Thus, Equation (3) can be rewritten asD
In Theorem 4.1, we prove that there is an election with the maximum distortion value and a simple structure. The basic idea to prove Theorem 4.1 is similar to that of Theorem 3.1; we collect the voters using a sequence of valid displacements, albeit with a new definition of valid displacement.
Definition 4.2. A displacement is valid, if it does not decreaseD(E).
The procedure of proving that a displacement is valid for this case is relatively tougher than the previous model. The reason is that we do not have a closed-form expression which represents the winning probability of each candidate. In Lemmas 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 we explain our tools to discover valid displacements. Lemma 4.3. For each voter v i ∈ A, there is a point x i ∈ B such that moving v i to x i is a valid displacement. Furthermore, for each voter v j ∈ C, there is a point y j ∈ D such that moving v j to y j is a valid displacement.
Lemma 4.4. Let v i and v j be two voters located respectively at x i and x j ∈ B. Furthermore, suppose that
where ε is a positive constant. Then, at least one of the following displacements is valid:
• Moving both the voters to
• Moving v i to x i − ε and v j to x j + ε.
Lemma 4.5. Let v i and v j be two voters located respectively at x i , x j ∈ D. Then, there exists a point x between x i and x j , such that moving both the voters to x is a valid displacement. 
An Almost Tight Bound onD(·)
In this section, we discuss the value ofD(·), when the probability function is ζ β with β ∈ [0, 1]. As mentioned, to prove our upper and lower bounds in this section, we subsequently use the bounds obtained in Section 3.1. For brevity, we useḊ * β to refer to the maximum distortion value of the expected winner for probability function ζ β .
Similar to Section 3.1, we begin with the boundary case of ζ 0 . By a similar argument as in Section 3.1, for ζ 0 we have the tight bound of 3 on the value of maximum distortion. For β > 0, we prove Theorem 4.6 which is the most technical result of the paper. This theorem provides an asymptotic upper bound on the maximum expected distortion for any ζ β with β ∈ (0, 1]. Theorem 4.6. For any α > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1], the expected distortion value of every election whose candidates receive at least
expected number of votes, is at most (1 + 2α)Ḋ * β .
For instance, for α = 1/6, Theorem 4.6 states that for every election whose candidates receive at least 2552 expected number of votes, the distortion value is upper bounded by 4/3Ḋ * β which for β = 1 is 4/3Ḋ * 1 2. We complement Theorem 4.6 by describing how to construct bad examples with distortion value nearḊ * . Example 1. Consider Convex Program 4, with an additional constraint that #L ≥ #R(1 + ε), and letḊ * * be the answer of this convex program and E * * be its corresponding election instance. By Chernoff bound, for large enough value of #L, candidate L almost surely wins the election, i.e.,
Note that, the bound provided by Theorem 4.6 is almost tight; as the election size grows, the upper bounds of Theorem 4.6 tends to the distortion value of the Example 1. However, for elections with a small number of voters, the distortion value might be larger. For example, consider a simple scenario where there is one voter located at point 1 + ε ∈ D and β = 1 (see Figure 11 ). For this case, the distortion value is
which tends to 2 as ε → 0. We conjecture that this example is the worst possible scenario and the value ofD(·) is upper bounded by 2 for any election with any size while β = 1. 
General Metric
In this section, we generalize our results for the general metric space. Suppose that the voters and candidates are located in an arbitrary metric M. By definition, for every voter i and candidates L, R we have:
•
We suppose without loss of generality that d L,R = 1. For this case, we prove Theorem 5.1, which extends our results to general metric spaces. Note that Theorem 5.1 considers bothḊ(·) andD(·). By this theorem for every 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, the same upper bounds we obtained on the distortion value for the line metric also works for any arbitrary metric space.
Theorem 5.1. Let D L β be the maximum distortion value for probability function ζ β and line metric, and let D M β be the maximum distortion value for probability function ζ β and arbitrary metric space
Proof of Theorem 5.1. To prove Theorem 5.1, we show that for every election E in an arbitrary metric space, there exists an election E in line metric, such thatḊ (E) ≤Ḋ (E ) andD (E) ≤D (E ).
Assume w.l.o.g. that candidate R is the optimal candidate. Let V be the set of voters in election
Based on the value of c i , we partition the voters into two subsets V + and V − , where
Now, we construct election E as follows: consider a line and two candidates L , R located respectively at 0 and 1. For each voter v i ∈ V − , we consider a voter v i in E , located at point
both v i and v i participate in their corresponding elections with equal probabilities. Similarly, for each voter v i ∈ V + , we consider a voter v i located at point
In conclusion, for every i, voters v i and v i cast a vote in their corresponding elections with equal probabilities. Thus, the expected winners of E and E are the same, and we have
By a similar argument, we can also conclude that
Note that
By simple calculation, we have
Since the expected winner is the same in E and E , Equation (7) immediately implies thaṫ D (E) ≤Ḋ (E ) . Furthermore, considering Equations (3) , (6), and (7) we haveD (E) ≤D (E ) .
Future Directions
In this study, we analyzed the distortion value in a spatial voting model with two candidates, where the voters were allowed to abstain. The set of results in this paper provides a rather complete picture of the model. However, the model we developed in this paper is for two candidate elections. Therefore, it does not consider the possible challenges that frequently arise in multi-candidate elections. One future direction is to extend this model to include multi-candidate elections.
Another interesting open question is to analyze the expected distortion value of the elections with a small number of voters. The counter-example in Section 4.1 refutes the existence of an upper bound better than 2. We believe that this example is the worst possible scenario. However, no formal proof is provided.
A Missing Proofs
In the proof of several theorems and lemmas, we use Observation A.1. n . Let c and c be the contribution to the average social cost of L and R by voters other than v i , respectively. Before moving v i to 0, we havė
and after the movement we haveḊ
where E is the election after the transformation. By Observation A.1, we haveḊ (E) ≤Ḋ (E ) which implies that moving v i to 0 is a valid displacement.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Initially, v i votes for L with probability (1 − 2x i ) β , and v j votes for R with probability (2x j − 1) β . Now, suppose that we move v i to x i + δ and v j to x j − δ (δ can be negative). Since we assume that these movements do not change the regions where the voters belong to, after the displacement, v i votes for L with probability (1 − 2x i − 2δ) β , and v j votes for R with probability (2x j − 2δ − 1) β . Let ∆ i be the difference between the contribution of v i to #L, before and after the displacement. Similarly, let ∆ j be the difference between the contribution of v j to #R before and after the movement. We have:
Choose δ as below
For the case of 1 − 2x i ≥ 2x j − 1 we have:
And in the case of 1 − 2x i < 2x j − 1 we have:
By straightforward calculus, we can conclude that choosing δ as below implies ∆ i ≥ ∆ j : Finally, since we move two voters in regions B and C equally in the opposite directions, the distortion values of each candidate remains unchanged.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. We prove Lemma 3.5 for region D. The same argument can be used to prove Lemma 3.5 for region B. Let ε = |x i − x j |/2. Recall the definition of ∆ i and ∆ j from the proof of Lemma 3.4. For this displacement, we have:
Thus, we have
Note that since ζ β (x) = 1 2x−1 β is a decreasing and convex function, we have
and
, combining Inequality (9) by these two inequalities implies ∆ i + ∆ j ≤ 0 (see Figure  12 ).
In addition, since the voters move in the opposite directions and by the same distance hence, the distortion value of the candidates does not change. Therefore, this modification is a valid displacement.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. First, we state two simple and natural Corollaries of Lemmas 3.4, and 3.5. 
Corollary A.1 (of Lemma 3.4). We can move each voter in region C to either 1 or 1/2 by a sequence of valid displacements.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary voter v j ∈ (1/2, 1). Since L is the expected winner, there exists at least one voter, say
Corollary A.2 (of Lemma 3.5). We can collect all the voters of region B to some point x ∈ B with a sequence of valid displacements. Furthermore, we can collect all the voters of region D to some point x ∈ D with a sequence of valid displacements.
Proof of Theorem A.2. By applying Lemma 3.5 iteratively to the furthest voters in each region, the maximum distance between voters in each region decreases iteratively. This procedure can be applied until all the voters gather in one point. Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 3.1. First, we prove that by Lemma 3.3 and Corollaries A.1, and A.2, every election E can be reduced to an election E , such that
• E and E have the same expected winner.
•Ḋ (E) ≤Ḋ (E ).
• All the agents in E are located at three points x b , x d and x m , where
Consider an arbitrary election E. First by Lemma 3.3, we move all the voters in region A to 0. Next, by on Corollary A.1 we move each voter in region C to one of the points 1/2 or 1. After these displacements, all the voters belong to one of regions B or D (note that the voters located in the borderlines belong to both regions). Finally, by Corollary A.2, we collect all the voters in regions B and D at some points x b ∈ B, x d ∈ D, and x m = 0.5.
Finally, let E * be an election with the maximum distortion. Applying the above reduction yields an election E * * with the maximum distortion, and the desired structure.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. We prove the statement of Lemma 4.3 for regions A and B. The same argument can be made to prove the lemma for regions C and D. Let x i be the current location of v i in region A (x i < 0). By definition, v i casts a vote with probability 1/ (1 − 2x i ) . Now, consider the point x = −x i / (1 − 2x i ). We claim that an agent at x, votes for L with the same probability as v i . First, note that since x i < 0,
Hence, the preferred candidate of the voter located at x is L. Furthermore, for any agent at x, the probability of casting a vote is
Hence, by moving v i from x i ∈ A to x i = −x i 1−2x i the probability that v i votes for L remains the same. Now, let D (L) be the distortion of candidate L, after moving v i to x. We have
.
Note that before the displacement, we had
Furthermore, we have
Hence, using Observation A.1 we conclude that D (L) > D (L), which in term implies that moving v i to x is a valid displacement.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Let r i be an indicator variable defined in the following way:
otherwise
In addition, letL andR be two random variables indicating the number of votes L and L receive respectively. We haveL =
By Equation (3), we haveD
Note that for both the displacements, values of D(L) and D(R) remain intact, since we displace two voters by equal margins in opposite directions. However, they may change the probability of the occurrences of events r i = 1 and r j = 1. Let r i and r j be the new indicator variables corresponding to v i and v j , after one of the displacements and let
We have:
and let δ c k be the value of δ c for the k'th type of displacement (i ∈ [2] ). By straightforward calculus, we can show that:
Hence, one of ∆ 1 or ∆ 2 is less than or equal to 0, which means its corresponding displacement does not increase the wining probability of L and therefore does not decrease the value ofD(E).
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Assume without loss of generality that x i < x i . We show that we can move both the voters to point
Letv k be a random variable which is equal to 1, if v k casts a vote and 0 otherwise. In addition, let
where 0 ≤ k ≤ 2. Trivially, we have A 1 ≤ A 2 ≤ A 3 , and
Furthermore, note that we have
Letv i andv j indicating whether v i and v j cast a vote or note, after the displacement. We have
Thus, we have
Furthermore, by straightforward calculus, we can conclude that
Considering Equation (10) , and the fact A 0 ≤ A 3 we can imply that after this movement, value of P R decreases and the value of P L increases. Finally, let C and C be the cost of the agents other than v i and v j for L and R, respectively. By definition, before the displacement, we have
Moreover, after moving v i and v j to point t, we have:
Again, by straightforward calculus, it can be easily observed that
Thus, after this displacement, both D (L) and P L increases, which means that the value ofD (E) is also increases.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. First, note that by Lemma 4.3 we can suppose w.l.o.g that the interior of regions A and C are empty. Furthermore, by iteratively applying Lemma 4.5 to the farthest pair of points in D, we can collect all the voters in region D into a single point. For regions B, we show how to collect the voters using Lemma 4.4. Consider voters v i and v j in region B. Theorem 4.4 states that we can move v i and v j either toward or away from each other. If we could move v i and v j toward each other, we can collect them in point (x i + x j ) /2. Otherwise, we move v i and v j away from each other until one of v i or v j collides the boundaries (i.e., points 0 and 1/2). Now, consider the following procedure: let V be the set of voters located in interval (0, 1/2) (the interior of region B). While there exists two voters v i and v j in V such that x i < x j , we apply the above modification on v i and v j . This modification either collects v i and v j at location (x i + x j ) /2 or sends one of them to the boundary. One can easily observe that each time we apply the above procedure, value of
decreases. To see why, note that each time we collect two voters v i and v j in (x i + x j ) /2, the value of |V | · n 2 remains intact while the value of v i ,v j ∈V |x i − x j | decreases. On the other hand, when we send a voter to the boundary, value of |V | · n 2 is decreased by n 2 , but value v i ,v j ∈V |x i − x j | might increase. However, since |x i − x j | < 1/2, we have
and hence, the total value of η is decreased by at least n 2 /2. Since η ≥ 0, this process eventually ends. At the time that the process terminates, no two voters in the interior of region B are located at different locations, i.e., all the voters in the interior of region B are at the same location.
By applying these procedures we can restrict the location of voters to 4 different locations: x l = 0, x m = 0.5, and two point x b and x d in the interior of regions B and D, respectively.
To prove Theorem 4.6, we first prove Lemmas A.3 and A.4.
Lemma A.3. Let α be a constant, and E be an election instance, with the property that R is the optimal and the expected winner candidate, and
Proof of Theorem A.3. Our strategy to prove this lemma is as follows: we add a sufficient number of agents at point 0 to alter the expected winner to L. After this operation, since L is the expected winner, we know that the expected distortion of L is at mostḊ * . Next, based on the number of voters we added at point 0, we bound the value ofD(E). Let s be the minimum number of voters we need to add at point 0 to convert L to the expected winner. Since #R ≤ (1 + α)#L, and each voter at point 0 contributes 1 to #L, we have s ≤ α#L Let E be the election, after adding the agents at point 0. Furthermore, denote by cost (L) and cost (R), the costs of candidates L and R after adding the agents. Since the expected winner of E is L, the expected distortion of L is upper bounded byḊ * :
Moreover, since we add the agents at point 0, their cost for candidate L is zero and hence, cost (L) = cost(L). Thus, we have
Now, we show that the ratio cost (R)/cost(R) is upper bounded by 1 + 2α. First, let us calculate the explicit formulas of cost(R) and cost (R). As discussed before, we can assume w.l.o.g that the agents in E are located at 4 different points x l , x b , x m and x d . Let p z be the population of the voters that are located at x z , for z ∈ {l, b, m, d}. We have Finally, considering Equations (11) and (12) we have cost(L)/cost(R) D * ≤ 1 + 2α.
Regarding Equation (5), we haveD (E) ≤ (1 + 2α)Ḋ * .
Lemma A.4. Let α be a constant, and E be an election instance, with the property that R is the optimal and the expected winner candidate, and
LetL andR be two randoms variable indicating the number of votes that L and R receive in E, respectively. Furthermore, letT =L + 1 1 + α #R − #L.
We have
Let t = ( √ 1 + α)#L. Since t ∈ [#R/(1 + α), #R], we have
Now, using Chernoff bound, we provide an upper bound on P(T ≥ R): First, we show that if L would be the expected winner, thenD(E) ≤Ḋ * . Since R is the optimal candidate 4 , we can rewrite Equation (3) as
On the other hand, we know that the distortion of the expected winner is at mostḊ * , which means
Thus, we can assume that R is both the optimal and the expected winner. Now, based on the value of #R/#L, there are two cases: either #R/#L ≤ 1 + α or #R/#L > 1 + α. For the first case, by Lemma A.3, the value ofD(E) is upper bounded by (1 + 2α)Ḋ * . For the second case, since #L ≥ 9 8
by Lemma A.4, the expected distortion is upper bounded by (1 + 2α)Ḋ * . Combining these two cases yields the upper-bound of (1 + 2α)Ḋ * onD(E).
